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Contact

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Foreword

Welcome to AusNet Services’ Bushfire Mitigation Plan (the Plan).

The Plan outlines how we will manage our electricity distribution network to mitigate bushfire risk and fulfil our commitment to provide our customers with a reliable and safe electricity supply.

As the owner and operator of electrical assets, AusNet Services is required under the Electricity Safety Act (1998) to provide a Plan (5-yearly), including requirements set out in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations (2013), for approval by Energy Safe Victoria (ESV).

The Plan is subjected to annual internal and external review to provide an objective and robust framework for its continued development, including the adoption of emerging technologies and innovative ideas.

As the sponsor of our Network Safety Management Committee, I trust this Plan conveys key aspects of our Bushfire Mitigation Program and welcome contributions for the continued development of its effectiveness.

Alistair Parker

Executive General Manager
Regulated Energy Services

Signatories to the Bushfire Mitigation Plan;

Endorsed by

Recommended by

Prepared by

Siham Knowles
General Manager
Network Engineering

Phillip Bryant
Manager Network Safety

Hawaii Ho
Bushfire Mitigation Manager
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1 SCOPE

The Bushfire Mitigation Plan (the Plan) describes AusNet Services’ preventative strategies, procedures and processes within its Asset Management System used to monitor, investigate, report, analyse and implement programs to mitigate the risk of fire ignition associated with its supply networks. The Plan also describes the processes concerning management of customer private overhead electric lines.

2 OBJECTIVES

2.1 OVERVIEW

The Bushfire Mitigation Management Plan (the Plan), as required by the Electricity Safety Act 1998, forms part of our approved Electricity Safety Management Scheme (ESMS).

The ESMS ensures our Asset Management System has the appropriate structure of policies, processes, procedures and standards that will deliver our strategic objective of providing our customers with a safe and reliable electricity supply.

The Plan describes the policies, strategies and procedures within the Asset Management System that form our bushfire mitigation program, together with the processes for implementation, monitoring and review to ensure the Plan remains effective.


![Image](image.png)

**Figure 2-1** Asset Management System Certification & Approval

Compliance with relevant legislative obligations, the ESMS and the Plan is monitored by our Network Safety Management Committee. The Plan is subjected to annual internal and external review to provide an objective and robust framework for its continued development, including the adoption of emerging technologies and innovative ideas.

2.2 KEY OBJECTIVES

The key objectives of the Bushfire Mitigation Plan are to:

- Describe the strategies and programs implemented to mitigate the risk of fire ignition from supply network assets,
• Describe the processes and procedures for monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of the bushfire mitigation strategies and programs,
• Describe the corrective action processes and procedures for ensuring effectiveness of the bushfire mitigation program,
• Describe the processes and procedures that apply to operation and maintenance of the supply network during the fire season period and total fire ban and code red days,
• Nominate persons responsible for preparation and implementation of the Plan and their contact details,
• Provide contact details in the event of an emergency, and
• Demonstrate compliance with the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013. Appendix 1 provides a compliance matrix for this Plan.

Achievement of these objectives is supported through initiatives that include:
• Use of skilled people and technology to continue the development of safe distribution networks through:
  o Underground distribution networks
  o Increasing distribution feeder automation
  o Enhanced protection and control
  o Asset condition monitoring and replacement programs
• Consultation with municipalities, landowners and other affected persons to ensure the planting of appropriate trees near powerlines and relocation of powerlines where appropriate

3 POLICY
3.1 BUSHFIRE MITIGATION
AusNet Services policy is to implement a bushfire mitigation management strategy that complies with legislative requirements and creates a harmonious balance for community safety, preservation of the environment and cost effectiveness.

We aim to:
• Minimise the risk of fire ignitions by AusNet Services’ distribution network assets that could become a wildfire and threaten public safety and property;
• Meet the requirements of the Act, Regulations and Code;
• Regularly review and develop management programs, processes, practices, methods and implement efficiencies for the benefit of customers and other stakeholders;
• Minimise the frequency and length of disruptions to the general public;
• Be committed to the safety of the community, as a whole, and employees engaged in the provision of the services;
• Preserve and enhance the environment; and
• Raise awareness of all aspects of bushfire mitigation through increased communication

3.2 ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO FIRE CONTROL AUTHORITIES
AusNet Services' policy in respect to provision of assistance to Fire Control Authorities in their investigation of fires near supply networks is;

AusNet Services will provide assistance and advice to Fire Control Authority personnel to ensure that safe approach distances are maintained in accordance with the relevant ‘Limits of Approach’ contained within the ‘Code of Practice on Electrical Safety for the Distribution Businesses in the Victorian Electricity Supply Industry’ (the Green Book) for the purposes of their investigation of fire incidents near network assets.

Assistance includes ensuring all un-safe electrical assets are made safe before the commencement of investigations and the provision of any reports relating to serious
4 REFERENCES

- Asset Inspection Manual (30-4111)
- Asset Management Strategy (AMS 20-01)
- Bushfire Mitigation Manual (BFM 21-79)
- Distribution Business Electrical Safety Performance Reporting Guide (ESV)
- Electricity Distribution Code (Essential Services Commission)
- Electricity Safety Act 1998
- Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013
- Electricity Safety Management Scheme (ESMS 10-03)
- Energy Networks Australia, Doc 017-2008, Industry Guideline for the Inspection, Assessment and Maintenance of Overhead Powerlines
- Energy Safe Victoria, Distribution Business Electrical Safety Performance Reporting Guide
- Enhanced Network Safety strategy (AMS 20-13)
- Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce, Final Report, 30 September 2011
- Power Line Bushfire Safety, Victorian Government Response to The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Recommendations 27 and 32, December 2011
- Protection Setting Operation Guidelines on Total Fire Ban and Code Red Days’ (BFM 21-10)
- Total Fire Ban Administration Manual’ (D127)
- Vegetation Management Plan (BFM 10-05)
## 5 DEFINITIONS

Definitions of the main terms used in the Plan are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At risk</td>
<td>Overhead electric lines, including their supporting structures and attachments in HBRA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Code of Practice for Electric Line Clearance (Vegetation) 2010 prescribed for the purpose of Part 8 of the Electricity Safety Act and is the Schedule contained in the Electricity Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codified Area</td>
<td>Area defined in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations as an ‘Electric Line Construction Area’. These are prescribed geographical areas of highest fire loss consequence where replacement or construction of powerlines must be with insulated cable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDPR</td>
<td>Electricity Distribution Price Review. Involves Distribution Businesses submitting their plans every five years for managing the networks to the Australian Energy Regulator for approval of revenue streams through customer network charges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESV</td>
<td>Energy Safe Victoria which is the technical regulator in Victoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESMS</td>
<td>Electricity Safety Management Scheme as required under the Electricity Safety Act 1998 and Electricity Safety (Management) Regulations 2009 for the provision of an asset management system to safely design, construct, operate, maintain and de-commission supply networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme HBRA</td>
<td>The area defined by the fire loss consequence modelling determined by the Fire Services Commissioner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire danger period</td>
<td>Means a period declared under the Country Fire Authority Act 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBRA</td>
<td>Hazardous bushfire risk area as defined under Section 80 of the Electricity Safety Act. Assets within these areas are defined under the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations as ‘at risk supply networks’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection</td>
<td>Visual inspection of the above ground components of overhead electric lines which may be undertaken through either ground based or aerial inspection programs in accordance with the Asset Inspection Manual 30-4111.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection &amp; test</td>
<td>Ground based visual inspection program that includes intrusive test and treatment of timber poles in accordance with the Asset Inspection Manual 30-4111.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regulations   | Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013  
Electricity Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations 2010 |
| SAMS          | Spatial Analysis Management System.                             |
| Supply networks | A network consisting of electric lines, substations, circuits and any other thing required for the purposes of the transmission, distribution or supply of electricity; transmission company has the same meaning as in the Electricity Industry Act 2000. |
| SWER          | Single Wire Earth Return – A high voltage distribution network operating at 12.7kV. |
6 GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The electricity distribution network area within Eastern Victoria as detailed within our Spatial Analysis Management System (SAMS) is shown below.

Figure 6-1 AusNet Services Sub-transmission & 22kV Distribution network

A typical download from SAMS is included in Appendix 2.
## 7 CONTACTS

### Major Electricity Company

AusNet Services  
Contact Details  
Level 31, 2 Southbank Boulevard,  
Southbank 3006  
Tel: 9695 6000

### Person Responsible for Plan Preparation

Hawaii Ho  
Contact Details  
Bushfire Mitigation Manager  
Level 31, 2 Southbank Boulevard,  
Southbank 3006  
Tel: 9695 6000

### Person Responsible for Carrying Out Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Contact Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Alistair Parker       | Executive General Manager, Regulated Energy Services, AusNet Services  
                        | Level 31, 2 Southbank Boulevard, Southbank 3006  
                        | Tel: 9695 6000 |
| Siham Knowles         | General Manager Network Engineering, Regulated Energy Services, AusNet Services  
                        | Level 31, 2 Southbank Boulevard, Southbank 3006  
                        | Tel: 9695 6000 |

### Emergency Contact

Customer & Energy Operations Team  
131 799 (24 hours)

### Bushfire Mitigation Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AusNet Services Office</th>
<th>AusNet Services Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office hours 9.00AM – 5.00PM Mon-Frid; excluding public holidays</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-1 AusNet Services Contact List
8 PREVENTATIVE STRATEGIES

8.1 SUMMARY

AusNet Services’ ESMS applies a full life cycle asset management philosophy for the management of its electricity networks. This management philosophy supports a continuous improvement approach toward the development and maintenance of preventative strategies designed to mitigate bushfire risk. These strategies are separated into three broad programs.

The first program contains activities associated with general asset maintenance and replacement. The processes and procedures supporting this program are contained within AusNet Services’ Bushfire Mitigation Manual (BFM 21-79).

The second program of preventative strategies is derived through analysis of asset condition and performance monitoring. This process identifies cost effective preventative strategies that complement the general maintenance program and are described in AusNet Services’ Enhanced Network Safety Strategy (AMS 20-13).

This program includes works derived from the $200M Powerline Replacement Fund established by the Victorian Government in response to recommendation 27 of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. The Powerline Replacement Fund is replacing bare wire powerlines within the highest bushfire consequence areas with insulated overhead, underground or alternative technologies to reduce the risk of bushfires caused by overhead electrical assets.

8.1.1 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) provided a range of recommendations relating to distribution networks which are addressed within this Plan. Recommendations that required further investigation and analysis due to technical complexities were addressed by the Powerlines Bushfires Safety Taskforce (PBST) and their recommendations subsequently accepted by the Victorian Government. Recommendations 27, 28 & 29 are reflected through changes to the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations. Appendix 3 contains a summary of the VBRC recommendations and reference within the Plan that describes implementation.

8.2 BUSHFIRE MITIGATION MANUAL

AusNet Services’ Bushfire Mitigation Manual (BFM 21-79) contains the policies and procedures through which general cyclic asset maintenance & replacement programs are maintained. The objective of scheduled inspection and maintenance activities is to ensure the safe and reliable operation of electrical assets.

- Asset inspection program,
  - Scheduled pole inspections
  - Pole reinforcement or replacement
  - Pole top & conductor hardware maintenance
  - Low voltage spreader maintenance
  - Bird covers
  - Surge diverters
  - Expulsion Drop Out fuses
  - Private Overhead Electric Lines
- SWER earth testing & maintenance program,
- Vegetation management program,
  - Vegetation pruning and removal program
  - Private Overhead Electric Line clearance management
8.2.1 SCHEDULED POLE INSPECTIONS

A three year interval, cyclic inspection program, is maintained for AusNet Services’ at risk supply network assets and Private Overhead Electric Lines (POEL).

Cyclic inspection of at risk poles is undertaken through the combination of ground (test & inspection) and aerial based inspection cycles, each set to 60 month intervals. These two inspection cycles are offset by 30 months to one another to ensure inspections are undertaken within the 37 month interval prescribed in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations. Poles unable to be inspected by aerial methods are scheduled for an additional ground based visual inspection.

A transition plan has been implemented that will see all overhead supply assets located in areas other than hazardous bushfire risk areas move from 63 and 123 month inspection intervals for timber and concrete poles respectively, to a 61 month inspection interval by 30th June 2019. The transition is in response to a new regulatory obligation introduced within the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013. The plan has been approved and an exemption to the regulations provided by Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) for the transition.

Inspection schedules for poles are set within the asset data management system (SAP) which enables forward planning and forecasting. Maintenance and/or replacement activities identified through the cyclic inspections are recorded within the asset management system. Criteria for assessment and prioritisation of asset maintenance are contained within the Asset Inspection Manual (30-4111).

Assessment criteria for POELs are contained within the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations.

8.2.2 POLE REINFORCEMENT OR REPLACEMENT

This preventative strategy requires the monitoring of pole condition to prevent pole failures. The primary risks are decay or white ant infestation of timber poles. This risk is addressed through a condition monitoring and treatment program for timber poles which includes an internal assessment of a timber poles sound wood and application of timber preservative treatment. The combination of preservative treatment and the staking of timber poles assessed as suitable can safely extend the life of timber poles. Timber poles assessed as requiring replacement are recorded in the asset management system for replacement, with either timber or concrete poles.

A key asset replacement policy is the use of concrete poles for complex or key assets such as a pole type substation which provides protection against damage from bushfire events, white ants and rot.

8.2.3 POLE TOP & CONDUCTOR

This preventative strategy requires the condition monitoring through the cyclic inspection program of pole top hardware such as crossarms, insulators, conductor, conductor ties and connections. Failures of these asset types, in high bushfire risk areas, are identified as presenting a higher risk of bushfire ignition. Items identified for maintenance or replacement are recorded in the asset management system and scheduled for action according to business rules contained within the Bushfire Mitigation Manual.

A key asset replacement policy is the replacement of timber high voltage crossarms with steel which provide a significantly reduced risk of unplanned failure.
8.2.4 LOW VOLTAGE SPREADERS

A requirement of AusNet Services’ Bushfire Mitigation Manual is the fitting of low voltage spreaders to open wire low voltage circuits located in areas designated as high bushfire risk areas. Spreaders reduce the risk of conductor clashing during severe winds or external contact with low voltage conductors. The clashing of low voltage conductors have been identified as presenting a higher risk of bushfire ignition. A requirement of the inspection program is to ensure compliance to the preventative strategy.

The long term preventative strategy is for the progressive removal of open wire low voltage in high bushfire risk areas. This will be achieved through application of AusNet Services’ current design standard for new low voltage circuits in high bushfire risk areas which requires construction with either aerial bundled cable or underground. Current design standards are applied where major asset replacement of augmentation is required.

8.2.5 BIRD COVERS

The former State Electricity Commission of Victoria identified a higher risk of bird flashovers on concrete intermediate poles fitted with five and six shed post form insulators. Bird and animal flashovers were identified as a bushfire ignition risk. Accordingly, a subsequent retro-fit preventative strategy was deployed that required the fitting of bird covers to prevent insulator flashover caused by birds and animals. The asset inspection program monitors and ensures compliance to this strategy is maintained.

The long term preventative strategy is for the application of a ‘stretch’ post insulator, which provides an increased clearance distance. This is reflected in current design standards for new assets.

8.2.6 SURGE DIVERTERS

A surge diverter is a device designed to protect electrical apparatus from transient over voltages, such as lightning, by providing a path to earth for the impulse current. Since the 1980s, monitoring of performance has identified makes and types that present higher risk of bushfire ignition following certain modes of failure. A preventative strategy of identifying and replacing those with higher risk of bushfire ignition is maintained through the cyclic asset inspection program.

8.2.7 EXPULSION DROP OUT FUSES

An expulsion drop out (EDO) fuse is a high voltage overcurrent protection device used to protect sections of overhead powerline and pole type distribution substations. The cyclic inspection program monitors the condition of these devices to identify cracked porcelain, corrosion or misaligned fuse mounts.

8.2.8 PRIVATE OVERHEAD ELECTRIC LINES

The inspection program for POELs includes assessment against the criteria contained in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations. Failure of POELs in high bushfire risk areas has been identified as a bushfire ignition risk. The Bushfire Mitigation Manual includes the procedures for customer notification of impending inspection and the issue and management of any defects identified through the inspection. The Manual also includes procedures for the notification and disconnection of POELs with urgent defects on Total Fire Ban days.

8.2.9 SWER EARTH TESTING & MAINTENANCE

A sample based testing plan, in accordance with AS 2490 – 1997, is applied to distribution network earths annually and the results assessed by the Line Assets department to determine corrective actions and future sampling rates. Results from sample based testing for SWER
ears has required the adoption of 100% testing which is scheduled within the asset data management system (SAP) with a 10 year inspection and test interval. Earths found above the required specification limits are maintained or replaced.

8.2.10 VEGETATION MANAGEMENT

Vegetation clearances adjacent to overhead powerlines are managed in accordance with the *Electricity Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations*. Failure to maintain clearance spaces to overhead powerlines provides an increased risk of bushfire ignition through conductor clashing or ignition of vegetation in direct contact with powerlines.

The Vegetation Management Plan *(BFM 10-05)* is provided annually to Energy Safe Victoria for acceptance. The Plan includes procedures for the cyclic inspection, customer notification and consultation and the pruning and removal of vegetation to maintain the prescribed clearance spaces.

8.2.10.1. VEGETATION PRUNING AND REMOVAL

The Vegetation Management Plan contains procedures for the notification and consultation with customers and stakeholders prior to the commencement of identified pruning and removal works. This process involves the identification of:

- Habitat for endangered species,
- Significant or historical trees,
- Hazard trees. (Program included in Section 7.3, Enhanced Network Safety)

8.2.10.2. PRIVATE OVERHEAD ELECTRIC LINES

The Vegetation Management Plan contains procedures for the inspection and subsequent issue and management of POEL clearance defects to customers.

8.3 ENHANCED NETWORK SAFETY

The Enhanced Network Safety strategy *(AMS 20-13)* contains preventative strategies and programs that are additional to those undertaken through the general maintenance program. These strategies have been developed through asset performance monitoring to identify cost effective programs to mitigate bushfire risk to as low as reasonably practicable. These strategies include the following:

- Expulsion Drop Out (EDO) fuse replacement,
- Hazardous trees removal,
- Bird/animal proofing of complex HV structures,
- Cross-arm replacement,
- High voltage pin type insulator replacement,
- Conductor replacement,
- Neutral screened service replacement,
- Replacement of bare wire powerlines with insulated in highest fire consequence areas,
- Enhanced feeder protection & control,
  - SWER Automatic Circuit Reclosers
  - Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter installation
- Total Fire Ban day protection scheme settings,
- Armour rods and vibration dampers,
- Overhead lines circuit clearances,
- High voltage Aerial Bundled Cable (ABC) replacement

A key to the optimisation of these programs is the application of the Fire Loss Consequence Model (FLCM), developed by the Government’s Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce, in asset
risk modelling. The FLCM provides detailed discrimination of potential consequences of a bushfire initiated from network assets which support the identification and prioritisation of network operation and maintenance activities that can mitigate the bushfire risk.

The following provides a brief description of the strategies contained in the Enhanced Network Safety strategy.

8.3.1 EXPULSION DROP OUT FUSE REPLACEMENT

The Asset Management Strategy for Medium Voltage Fused Switch Disconnectors (AMS 20-61) is to progressively replace EDO units with either boric acid or fault tamer fuse unit types. Boric acid and fault tamer fuse units have been identified as having performance characteristics superior to EDOs which have been identified as having an increased risk of fire ignition in the event of mal-operation. All current FSDs on rural overhead distribution networks present some risk of fire ignition through mal-operation. The transition prioritises fuse unit replacement in the highest fire loss consequence areas. Application of Energy Limiting Fuse (ELF) and EDO fuse links are used under planned maintenance works in low fire loss consequence areas and during unplanned (fault and emergency) works.

8.3.2 HAZARDOUS TREE REMOVAL

Whilst a significant majority of trees outside the clearance spaces prescribed by the Electricity Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations have the potential to fall or shed limbs onto overhead powerlines, this does not automatically deem them a ‘hazard’. The regulations seek to cost effectively manage these risks through the requirement for trees identified as ‘likely’ to fall onto overhead powerlines to be assessed by a qualified arborist to determine what, if any, action is required. Trees identified for action are included together with other trees considered unsuitable in AusNet Services’ hazardous tree program described in its Vegetation Management Plan (BFM 10-05). Based upon current detection rates, the hazard tree program addresses approximately 5,000 hazard trees per annum.

8.3.3 BIRD & ANIMAL PROOFING

This program is designed to reduce the risk of high voltage electrical flashovers caused by birds and animals through the retro-fitting of complex high voltage structures, such as pole type substations and switches, with increased levels of insulation. AusNet Services’ design standards for the construction of new and replacement assets include increased levels of insulation that prevent high voltage electrical flashovers.

8.3.4 CROSSARM REPLACEMENT

The Asset Management Strategy for Crossarms (AMS 20-57) acknowledges failures are an identified bushfire risk. To address crossarm failure rates aerial inspection was introduced in 2010 to provide an enhanced level of asset condition monitoring. A subsequent review of crossarm assessment criteria has provided inspection personnel with greater ability to apply a calibrated condition assessment rating. Together with the established practice of steel crossarms being the standard for new and replacement high voltage crossarms, failure rates are declining.

8.3.5 HV PIN TYPE INSULATORS

The Asset Management Strategy for Insulators (AMS 20-66) was reviewed in 2015 and found the targeted replacement program undertaken during 2011-2015 has reduced failure rates to a level whereby future replacement will rely upon the crossarm replacement program to manage insulator failure rates and risk. Replacement of high voltage crossarms with steel requires replacement of pin type insulators with current standard insulators. Fires associated with pin type insulator failure are typically caused by pollution and subsequent tracking during damp weather conditions.
8.3.6 CONDUCTOR REPLACEMENT

The Asset Management Strategy for Conductor (AMS 20-52) recognises conductor failure presents a high risk of bushfire ignition. Performance monitoring and analysis of conductor failures and condition, together with application of the government’s Fire Loss Consequence Model are key attributes that are used to identify and prioritise sections of conductor for replacement. From this, increased volumes of conductor have been identified for replacement over and above that identified from the asset inspection program. This process has resulted in the development of enhanced conductor condition assessment criteria that is now used as part of the general maintenance program.

Amendments to the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013 introduced 1 May 2016 require any planned conductor replacement (1kV to 22kV) of four or more consecutive spans to be constructed with insulated or covered conductor within codified areas.

At the time of 1 May 2016, the codified areas had approximately 1,680km of bare wire, medium voltage powerlines. This consisted of approximately 670km of SWER, 650km three phase and 360km of single phase powerlines.

Acceptance by the Government, in December 2011, of recommendations by the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce, included the establishment of a $200M Powerline Replacement Fund (PRF). Administration of this fund is undertaken by the Government’s Powerline Bushfire Safety Program (PBSP) department which is selecting and allocating funds to distribution businesses for the replacement of powerlines in the highest fire loss consequence (Electric Line Construction/Codified1) areas across the state over a ten year period.

Replacement of powerlines in AusNet Services’ codified areas commenced in 2014 and will continue for the duration of the fund.

In addition to the PRF activities, AusNet Services will progressively replace remaining bare wire powerlines in codified areas through network replacement or relocation activities as described in Section 8.3.7 ‘Electric Line Construction (Codified) Areas’.

8.3.7 ELECTRIC LINE CONSTRUCTION (CODIFIED) AREAS

Construction of medium voltage powerlines with insulated cables or covered conductors provide a reduced risk of electrical flashover and arcing in the event of inadvertent contact. However, the cost of these construction methods are significantly greater than bare wire construction and are therefore considered for targeted application within codified areas.

AusNet Services’ design and construction manuals contain approved standards and drawings for accepted insulated cable and covered conductor construction. Design principles seek to achieve the least cost, technically acceptable options.

The locations of medium voltage lines specified within the regulations are defined as those lines being within an “electric line construction area”(codified area). The codified areas within AusNet Services’ franchise area are illustrated in figure 8.1 (red shaded areas).

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1 Refer Section 8.2.3.1 “Electric Line Construction (Codified) Areas”
Application of insulated or covered conductor construction standards within codified areas applies to the following network construction, replacement and relocation activities associated with medium voltage (1kV-22kV) electric lines.

With respect to replacement and relocation activities the regulations specify;

“planned replacement or relocation of an electric line that involves—
(a) the relocation of at least 4 consecutive spans of the electric line; or
(b) the replacement of conductors on at least 4 consecutive spans of the electric line.”

The following replacement and relocation activities and timing are considered 'planned';

**Replacement** ≥4 consecutive spans due to;
- Risk based – replacement based upon asset condition and criticality
- Condition based – replacement based upon inspection program
- Load growth – replacement with increased conductor size to meet load growth

**Relocation** ≥4 consecutive spans due to;
- Line relocation – customer or company initiated electric line relocation

Construction of any new medium voltage electric line that is part of the supply network must be constructed with insulated cable or covered conductor.

Replacement activities exempt from insulated cable or covered conductor construction within codified areas include;

- Fault and Emergency works as these works are not considered ‘planned’.
  - Where required planning and design timeframes can be achieved, due to deferral of supply restoration requirements, replacement of medium voltage assets will be undertaken to insulated or covered conductor standards.
Reporting to Energy Safe Victoria is provided monthly in accordance with their template which has identified the total route length of bare medium voltage lines in codified areas as at 1 May 2016 and the progressive replacement and the drivers for replacement.

8.3.8 NEUTRAL SCREENED SERVICE CABLES

The Asset Management Strategy for Service cables (AMS 20-76) recognises service cable failures present a risk of bushfire ignition. Performance monitoring and analysis has identified neutral screened service cables as those with the highest rates of failure. A replacement program includes a combination of scheduled replacement and targeted replacement which utilises Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) data and analysis to identify service cables with emerging defects. The replacement program is supported by maintenance procedures that require the replacement of neutral screened service cables in the event of any service faults or pole replacements with neutral screened services attached.

8.3.9 ENHANCED FEEDER CONTROL & PROTECTION

AusNet Services has developed and implemented protection and reclose settings for all protection devices supplying the high fire loss consequence areas.

The strategic direction established by AusNet Services has been reinforced by the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce’s (PBST) Final Report and the Government’s response which recommended application of protection settings on Total Fire Ban and Code Red Days as shown in Figure 8-2.

8.3.9.1. AUTOMATIC CIRCUIT RECLOSERS

AusNet Services has developed and implemented protection and reclose settings for all existing SWER, three-phase reclosers and circuit breakers for networks supplying high fire loss consequence areas.

AusNet Services completed the replacement in December 2015 of all SWER Oil Circuit Reclosers (OCRs) with remote controlled Automatic Circuit Reclosers (ACRs) to facilitate compliance with recommendation 32 of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. AusNet Services’ design standard for protection of SWER systems requires the application of remote controllable ACRs.

ACRs and circuit breakers offer remote controlled capability to modify electrical protection sequence settings that are applied in accordance with declared fire hazard ratings such as Total

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2 The PBST was formed to outwork complex technical aspects of the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission recommendations
3 Victorian Government Response to The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Recommendations 27 and 32, December 2011
Fire Ban and Code Red days. Protection sequence settings are applied in accordance with section 8.3.9 “Enhanced Feeder Control & Protection”.

8.3.9.2. **FEEDER PROTECTION & CONTROL**

Consistent with the protection and control objectives discussed above for ACRs, the replacement of relays and re-programming of an additional relays on 22kV distribution feeders within zone substations has been undertaken to provide an integrated distribution feeder protection and control framework. The framework provides programmable flexibility to achieve the prescribed functionality required for Total Fire Ban and Code Red days.

8.3.9.3. **RAPID EARTH FAULT CURRENT LIMITER IMPLEMENTATION**

Consistent with amendments to the *Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013* introduced on 1 May 2016, AusNet Services is developing and implementing REFCL technology in 22 nominated zone substations by 1 May 2023. The electrical protection technology is designed to minimise the fault current (energy) dissipated from phase to earth (wire to ground) faults on the 22kV network in order to reduce the risk of fire ignition associated with network incidents.

Implementation and testing by government of two different types of REFCL technology was completed at Kilmore South zone substation on a limited 40km section of network in 2014. These tests were subsequently used to inform the development of regulatory performance specifications ("required capacity") which are prescribed within the regulations. REFCL technology operating at the required capacity will minimise the risk of fire ignition associated with phase to ground faults on days of heightened fire danger such as those experienced on Ash Wednesday and Black Saturday.

Based upon a sample period of network fault data, analysis undertaken by the Government and CSIRO predict network fire related incidents associated with the nominated zone substations can be reduced by between 50-55%.

A REFCL operates when a single phase-to-earth fault occurs. Its operation causes the phase voltage of the faulted phase to be reduced to near earth potential (zero volts), thereby working to eliminate the flow of fault current. To achieve this, the REFCL is tuned to the capacitance of the electrical network. This compensation results in phase to ground voltage on the faulted phase reducing to near 0 volts whilst the healthy phases rise from 12.7kV up to 24.2kV (22kV plus 10 per cent).

Whilst the REFCL is compensating for a fault, the healthy phases remain energised and customers remain on supply. However, there remains a risk that the energised phases may be in an unsafe condition depending upon what the nature of the network fault is. Accordingly, a compensating period of up to 20 seconds has been determined which may be varied subject to a detailed risk assessment.

The REFCL ‘required capacity’ places the network electrical protection at an enhanced level of sensitivity and speed of operation which will interrupt the affected feeder after a predetermined period of compensation. The speed and sensitivity means that traditional protection devices distributed along a feeder will not operate as they currently do to detect and isolate a faulted section of the network. This results in greater numbers of customers having their electricity supply interrupted.

The potential impact on network reliability necessitates a balanced approach toward the application of REFCL technology. Accordingly, AusNet Services will operate REFCLs at the

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4 Required capacity is defined within the *Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations*. This provides the protection sensitivity required to minimise the risk of fire ignition due to a phase to ground fault.
'required capacity' specifically on days of heightened bushfire risk (Total Fire Ban & Code Red days). Application of heightened fire risk settings and operation are discussed in section 11.2.4 ‘REFCL Protection Settings’.

Operation of REFCLs outside heightened bushfire risk periods are at settings that are less sensitive than the ‘required capacity’. Should a REFCL detect a permanent low impedance phase to ground fault during these periods it will compensate for up to 20 seconds whilst traditional network protection schemes attempt to detect and isolate the fault. Compensation during heightened fire danger periods is reduced as the REFCL will seek to trip the faulted feeder rather than allow traditional protection schemes to operate.

AusNet Services plans to implement REFCL technology at the 22 zone substations prescribed in Schedule 2 of the regulations through three tranches of work. Figure 8-3 shows the location and planned commissioning dates of the REFCL technology, by zone substation, in each of the three tranches.

The installation program includes all works required to achieve the required performance criteria while also ensuring that network safety, reliability and compliance with our obligations under various industry codes, including the Victorian Electricity Distribution Code, are not compromised. The works consist of, but may not be limited to, all necessary substation works, and works on the feeders, such as network balancing, line hardening, replacing incompatible equipment and addressing increased HV customer connection point voltage levels.

Appendix 5 provides an outline of the capital works that AusNet Services plans to commence in the 2016-2020 regulatory control period for the purpose of implementing REFCL technology in accordance with its obligations under the regulations.

Tranche 1 includes implementation of Woori Yallock (WYK) which, as discussed in Section 8.4.1 ‘REFCLs’, continues to be the source of on-going research and development as AusNet
Services' first fully network operational REFCL. Initial commissioning scheduled for the 2016/17 fire season will not meet the 'required capacity' as these standards were prescribed post the initial design and construction of WYK. Phase 2 of WYK will include station and line balancing works to achieve operation at the 'required capacity'.

The cost effective delivery of the three tranches will require some work on subsequent tranches during the implementation of the overall program.

### 8.3.10 TOTAL FIRE BAN DAY ACR PROTECTION SETTINGS

Application of protection sequences are applied on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days in accordance with the table illustrated in figure 8-2. The process for application of protection sequences on high fire danger days is discussed in section 11.2.3 'Auto Reclose Suppression & Protection Setting Changes'.

The AN140 Fire Loss Consequence Model (FLCM) has been used to identify, within hazardous bushfire risk areas (HBRAs), those areas as having the highest consequence ('worst areas' per figure 8-2). The balance of HBRAs are regarded as the 'remaining areas' per table 8-2.

This model is recognised as representing the worst of the worst fire conditions and is based upon Ash Wednesday weather conditions, Fire Danger Index 140 and full ground fuel conditions. The designated 'worst' and 'remaining areas' do not change annually as happens under FLCMs that take into account annual ground fuel reduction. Endorsement of this model by the Network Safety Management Committee (NSMC) was received following presentation of an options paper to the October 2016 meeting.

A list of the devices and their respective protection sequences has been provided to Energy Safe Victoria. An updated list is provided where alteration to the designated ‘worst’ and ‘remaining’ areas occur.

### 8.3.11 ARMOUR RODS & VIBRATION DAMPERS

A retro-fitting program has been developed and implemented for the installation of conductor vibration dampers, which in accordance with industry standards, requires the fitting of armour rods. Application of armour rods and vibration dampers has resulted in approximately 60,000 installations completed in December 2015. A further 120,000 are scheduled to be completed by December 2020 in accordance with the Plan approved by ESV.

### 8.3.12 OVERHEAD LINE CIRCUIT CLEARANCES

A program has been developed and implemented to survey approximately 10,200 spans of overhead powerline by December 2015. The survey is targeted to poles carrying multiple circuits and will seek to confirm that clearances are being maintained in accordance with design standards. Adherence to design standards mitigates the risk of conductor clashing which may result in ground fire ignitions.

### 8.3.13 HIGH VOLTAGE AERIAL BUNDLED CABLE REPLACEMENT

Failure of non-metallic screened (NMS) high voltage aerial bundled cable (HV ABC) on the 22kV network is an identified bushfire risk. Performance monitoring and analysis of NMS HV ABC failures has been used to identify feeders with highest rates and risk of failures. These areas were concentrated in the Dandenong Ranges.

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5 2014/15 version
6 'Review of Protection Settings Regime on TFB Days', 19 October 2016.
AusNet Services completed a program in March 2016 that replaced NMS HV ABC across the Dandenong Ranges (approx. 62km) with either underground cable or light duty metallic screened (LDMS) aerial bundled cable. The longer term strategy (2016-2020) is to replace remaining 22kV NMS HV ABC across other sections of the network.

8.3.14 POWERLINE REPLACEMENT FUND

The Victorian Government, through the Powerline Bushfire Safety Program, is replacing bare wire powerlines in areas of highest bushfire consequence. The program’s ‘Powerline Replacement Fund’ makes available up to $200 million funding bare wire powerline replacement over a 10 year period within Victoria. Priority is being given to replacing powerlines that:

1. are part of a rural or regional electricity network;
2. are located in the areas of highest fire loss consequence;
3. support the State’s emergency management priorities; and
4. are cost effective and support the State in maximising the reach of the investment.

The funds are being allocated to Distribution Businesses and owners of bare wire private overhead electric lines (POEL), who are required to coordinate replacement planning and works, including engaging contractors, securing product supplies and obtaining local planning approvals.

8.4 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

Research and development has resulted in the implementation of new generation protection and control technology for SWER networks. Continued research and development of cost effective measures to mitigate bushfire risk in Victoria include the following key initiatives:

- Development and implementation of Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiters,
- Insulated cable technologies,
- Network data monitoring and analysis

8.4.1 RAPID EARTH FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS

With the advent of modern power electronics, this has revolutionised the performance of the classical Petersen Coil (ground fault neutraliser) by enabling it to dynamically monitor the residual currents flowing and thereby compensate to achieve near zero current flow. More recently, New Zealand distribution companies have been utilising this technology to improve supply reliability and quality.

A Victorian Electricity Supply Industry (VESI) REFCL technical working group, including Energy Safe Victoria, has been established to facilitate the sharing of learnings through the continued development and deployment of REFCLs by respective distribution businesses.

The first full network REFCL implementation and commissioning at WYK zone substation is scheduled for the 2016/17 fire season. The initial commissioning will not meet the ‘required capacity’ and will require additional works to meet the prescribed requirements introduced post the original design of WYK. The development of WYK will seek to establish the effectiveness of a REFCL in cost effectively mitigating bushfire risk without negatively impacting customer reliability on complex rural distribution networks that include:

- Combination of un-balance three phase, single phase networks,
- Installed distribution feeder automation (DFA) schemes,
- DFA scheme interconnection with adjacent zone substations,
- Extensive networks supplying highest fire loss consequence areas,
- HV embedded generation
8.4.2 INSULATED & COVERED CABLE TECHNOLOGIES

During 2012, AusNet Services initiated trials of insulated cable technologies applied in other distribution networks to ascertain their cost effectiveness, relative to existing cable standards used in the Victorian electricity supply industry, in mitigating bushfire risk. Aspects critical to the cost effectiveness of other cable technologies will be their ability to replace existing bare conductor with minimal reconstruction of existing pole structures and their insulation capabilities and compliance to requirements of the Electricity Safety (Electric Lines Clearance) Regulations 2010.

As at 2016, AusNet Services has added spacer cable and hybrid underground to its design standards. An additional covered conductor, trademarked as LowSag, is anticipated to be ready for application late 2016.

8.4.3 NETWORK DATA MONITORING AND ANALYSIS

AusNet Services has successfully undertaken proof of concept trials using real time network data to identify potential network faults. Two key sources of data being analysed are;

- Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) data, and
- Feeder protection relay data

In both cases, the trials involve the application of data algorithms that establish dynamic operating parameters for the sections of the network being monitored under ‘normal’ operating conditions. The algorithms seek to identify, under real time conditions, operating conditions that are outside the defined ‘normal’ operating conditions.

8.4.3.1. LOW VOLTAGE NETWORK FAULTS

Following trials that demonstrated the capability to identify defective low voltage neutral connections, implementation of this type of network monitoring through the control room has contributed to a significant reduction in reported neutral failures.

On-going development of AMI data analysis is seeking opportunities to identify conductor failures and network load forecasting at distribution substation level.

8.4.3.2. HIGH VOLTAGE NETWORK

Establishing normal operating parameters of the high voltage network has undergone proof of concept testing that has confirmed an ability to detect abnormalities on the high voltage network that have resulted in permanent faults. On-going development is seeking to test the ability of this initiative to identify potential faults on the multiphase and SWER sections of the high voltage distribution networks together with establishing levels of accuracy.

9 LIST OF WORKS

9.1 GENERAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

The general line maintenance program of preventative strategies to address network safety and bushfire risk is generated through scheduled cyclic condition based asset inspection and vegetation assessment programs. The works identified from the inspection and assessment programs are assigned a time based prioritisation within which the identified works should be scheduled for action.

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7 Underground HV with key structures such as switches and substations remaining overhead
The scheduling of works for ‘at risk\(^8\)’ assets, which includes scheduled asset inspections and vegetation assessments, are monitored through the Bushfire Mitigation Index (BMI). The target during the declared fire season is for the completion of all works within the respective time based prioritisation schedule. Completion of scheduled works within the prioritised dates ensures the BMI produces a zero index. A zero index means that no works are outstanding beyond their scheduled dates.

The table below lists the activities monitored through the BMI and the required times for completion of works.

\(^8\) ‘at risk’ = Assets located in hazardous bushfire risk areas.
### Inspection Item

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pole Population</th>
<th>Line Inspection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All HBRA poles inspected (cyclic)</td>
<td>60 month + 3 month float Ground line inspection cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All LBRA poles inspection (cyclic)</td>
<td>60 month + 3 month float Aerial inspection cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All HBRA poles inspected (cyclic)</td>
<td>inspection interval - 37 months maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All LBRA poles inspection (cyclic)</td>
<td>inspection interval – 61 months maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All US poles actioned</td>
<td>within 90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All LL poles actioned</td>
<td>within 912 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All HBRA Overhead PELs</td>
<td>inspected 37 months maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All LBRA PELs</td>
<td>inspected 61 months maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre Summer Tree Inspection,</td>
<td>annually by start of Fire Season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All recorded Code PT1 &amp; PT30 Trees actioned by</td>
<td>HBRA areas - Earlier of Start of Fire Season or 15 December. During the Fire Season Code PT1 and PT30 trees must be attended within 24 hours and 30 days respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All recorded HBRA Overhang (56M) trees (Current program to remove all 56Ms by 2016)</td>
<td>arboreal assessment by 1 November each year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Line Hardware, etc.
- All PT30 Attachments (includes: X Arms, LV Spreaders and Clamp-on Fuses, etc)
- All PT30 Conductors
- All Unacceptable SDs
- All PT90 22 kV Bird Covers
- All Priority 66 kV Bird Covers
- All PT180 Attachments
- All PT180 Conductors
- All PT180 22 kV deteriorated Bird Covers
- All PT30 Attachments rectified within 30 days
- All PT90 22 kV Bird Covers fitted within 90 days
- All PT180 Attachments rectified within 180 days
- All PT30 Attachments rectified within 30 days

### Private Electric Lines (PELs)
- All HBRA Overhead PELs
- All LBRA PELs
- All recorded Code PT1 & PT30 Trees actioned by
- All recorded HBRA Overhang (56M) trees (Current program to remove all 56Ms by 2016)

### Vegetation Management
- All recorded Code PT1 & PT30 Trees actioned by
- All recorded HBRA Overhang (56M) trees (Current program to remove all 56Ms by 2016)

### Private Electric Lines
- All Urgent Defective Private Overhead Electric Lines (POELs) not fire safe disconnect on days of Total Fire Ban and Code Red days

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**Table 9-1 General BFM Maintenance Preventative Strategies Program**

### 9.2 ENHANCED NETWORK SAFETY

The Enhanced Network Safety strategy *(AMS 20-13)* discussed in Section 8.3 summarises the range of asset plant and program strategies applied to reducing bushfire risk. The range of programs is optimised to provide a plan of works that are implemented and monitored through

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9. Subject to a current transition plan from 63 & 123 month intervals to 61 month. Refer Section 8.2.1 ‘Scheduled Pole Inspections’

10. Refer Note 6.
the Network Safety Management Committee\textsuperscript{11} (NSMC). The plan of work programs and respective program volumes will vary according to network performance outcomes and program effectiveness and efficiency.

The enhanced network safety program includes prescribed works detailed derived through Directions issued by Energy Safe Victoria and transition to compliance with changes to regulations.

Directions issued by ESV include the requirement to develop programs requiring application of vibration control and checking of circuit clearances. The Directions required the development of Plans\textsuperscript{12}, specifying the scope and timing for implementation of the programs, which have been approved by ESV.

ESV has provided AusNet Services an exemption for transition to compliance with vegetation clearances. This program addresses instances where vegetation overhangs bare conductors in hazardous bushfire risk areas (HBRA) which is no longer permitted under the \textit{Electricity Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations}.

\section*{10 ASSET INSPECTION}

\subsection*{10.1 INSPECTION PLAN}

AusNet Services has approximately 210,000 poles in areas designated hazardous bushfire risk recorded in its asset management system (SAP). Inspection of these assets at intervals less than 37 months is achieved through a combination of ground (test & inspection) based and an aerial based inspection cycles. A 60 month inspection interval applies to each cycle with the respective cycles offset by 30 months to one another.

Prior to amendments in 2013 to the \textit{Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations}, inspection intervals for timber and concrete poles in low bushfire risk areas were 63 and 123 months respectively. The amendments in 2013 introduced the requirement for low bushfire risk supply networks to be inspected within a maximum 61 month interval.

A transition plan has been implemented that will see all overhead supply assets located in areas other than hazardous bushfire risk areas move to a 61 month inspection interval by 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2019. The plan has been approved and an exemption to the regulations provided by Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) for the transition.

Planning and implementation for the inspection of these assets is co-ordinated through a single management group within AusNet Services and reported monthly to the Network Safety Management Committee (NSMC). A sample of the of an annual inspection plan is provided below.
Management reporting from the asset data management system enables the forecasting of resources through provision of 'look ahead' reports that forecasts the due inspection dates of HBRA & LBRA poles.

**10.2 INSPECTOR TRAINING**

Asset inspection activities are undertaken predominantly by AusNet Services employees. The training course utilised by AusNet Services for asset inspection personnel (employee or contract) undertaking ground based inspection has been approved by Energy Safe Victoria as shown in Appendix 4. This approval also acknowledged the recognition of prior learning received by existing asset inspection personnel. AusNet Services’ asset inspectors have received Certificate II Asset Inspection qualifications which are recorded in AusNet Services’ training register. The Post Description for an Asset Inspector requires the incumbent to have Certificate II Asset Inspection qualification.

Asset inspection personnel engaged in the aerial inspection program are qualified linesman. These asset inspection personnel have been inducted and trained in AusNet Services’ policies and procedures relating to this program. Energy Safe Victoria has approved the training course and requirements provided to these personnel as shown in Appendix 5.

The asset data management system (SAP) requires the recording of the identification of the asset inspector and audits are undertaken to ensure maintenance of inspection competency as described in Section 13.6 ‘Training’.

**11 OPERATION & MAINTENANCE PLANS**

In addition to Section 6.9 of AusNet Services’ Electricity Safety Management Scheme (ESMS 10-03) ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response’, the following describes the operation and maintenance plans associated with AusNet Services’ bushfire mitigation program.

**11.1 FIRE EVENTS**

**11.1.1 INVESTIGATION & ANALYSIS**

All network asset related fire events are investigated and reported to Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) in accordance with ESV's ‘Distribution Business Electrical Safety Performance Reporting Guide’. These events are recorded and analysis undertaken in order to identify network asset
management strategies that may result in the mitigation of these events. The strategies listed under Section 8, ‘Preventative Strategies’, have been developed and implemented following analysis of fire incidents.

11.1.2 MANAGEMENT OF FIRE EVENTS

Fire events reported to AusNet Services by customers, personnel or fire control agencies are reported to Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) in accordance with ESV’s ‘Distribution Business Electrical Safety Performance Reporting Guide’.

In the event of significant bushfires AusNet Services, together with other Distribution Businesses, has processes and procedures in place for a mutual aid program. Mutual aid programs are a requirement of the Distribution Code of Practice and these resources are managed and co-ordinated through AusNet Services’ Integrated Response and Contingency System (SPIRACS).

A committee comprised of senior managers from the distribution companies oversee this process and an emergency response plan has been formulated. It includes a set of standard procedures, the nomination of key personnel, communication arrangements, other support agencies and contractor lists. In the event of a major incident and the implementation of the plan the committee would establish strategies as necessary for the:

- Coordination of the response and electricity supply recovery,
- Media releases,
- Dealings with government; and
- Any other matters considered appropriate.

The role of AusNet Services will be one of support to the combating agencies such as SES, CFA, MFB and Victorian Police in matters relating to electricity supply.

If a disaster is declared by a Fire/Disaster Coordinator, and roadblocks erected, AusNet Services operational personnel authorised to switch the network must not enter into the restricted area. All operations must be performed external to the restricted area.

Arrangements may be agreed to between the Fire/Disaster Coordinator and the CEOT Manager to enable operations within the restricted area. This agreement must hold the safety of personnel paramount and personnel involved must be consulted and their agreement to the arrangements confirmed before entry is undertaken.

11.1.3 NETWORK CONTINGENCY PLANS & STRATEGIES

During previous fire events, AusNet Services’ Emergency Management Teams have utilised a number of strategies and contingency plans to either prevent asset damage or provide resources for post fire recovery activities. These include the following:

- Fuel reduction around timber poles ahead of fire front,
- Application of fire retardant to timber poles ahead of fire front,
- Fire spotting of asset fires after fire front passes,
- Resource planning and staging which includes:
  - Labour
  - Materials
  - Generators

11.2 TOTAL FIRE BAN & CODE RED DAYS

Total Fire Ban and Code Red days reflect the fire danger ratings ‘severe’, ‘extreme’ and ‘Code Red’ shown below. The Country Fire Authority (CFA) definitions for these fire danger rating
days indicate that should a fire start on a severe day, it ‘may be uncontrollable’, to extreme and code red where it ‘will be uncontrollable’. Days rated as ‘very high’ are regarded as ‘most likely be controlled’.

Prior to the declaration of the fire season AusNet Services will obtain annual fire season permits from the MFB, CFA and DSE enabling the use of fire in the open air on Total Fire Ban days. Copies of the permits will be placed on the AusNet Services Networks Intranet site. Field managers will ensure that relevant personnel within their organisation, including contractors, are advised of the permits.

On Total Fire Ban and Code Red days the following operation and maintenance plans are applicable.

11.2.1 CUSTOMER & ENERGY OPERATIONS TEAM (CEOT) RESPONSIBILITY

Urgent Defective Private Lines

The CEOT (24 hour control room) will arrange the disconnection of any outstanding urgent defective Private Overhead Electric Lines (POELs). This will include:

- Arranging Field Crews to disconnect any urgent defective POELs;
- Contacting owners of urgent defective POELs to advise them of the disconnection; and
- Arranging Field Crews to reconnect any disconnected POELs when Total Fire Ban has ended.

The Asset Inspection Manager has the responsibility to ensure that the CEOT has up to date information on all urgent defective POELs required to be disconnected on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days.

Fires

In accordance with standard operating procedure, the Availability Officer is to be advised immediately of any fires attended by fault crews, regardless of how they were started.

Sustained Unplanned Interruptions to Supply

In accordance with standard operating procedures and policy, if any feeder or HV line protection device operates on Total Fire Ban or Code Red days and supply is interrupted (other than for successful re-closes) and the fault is not known:

- The feeder or line must be patrolled or assessed prior to attempting restoration in accordance with ‘Feeder Patrols and Supply Restoration on High Voltage Overhead Lines’ (DOP10-10) and ‘Line Restoration Policy for TFB Days & Code Red Days’ (DOP 90-28) procedures.
11.2.2 AREA OPERATIONS OFFICER RESPONSIBILITY

The Area Operations Officers will notify the CEOT of any planned interruptions that have been cancelled, and those that have Regional Business Manager's approval to proceed.

The CEOT in turn will:
- Advise the Faults and Emergencies Call Centre and the Customer Services Centre
- Update Power-On to reflect the cancellation
- Liaise with Senior Asset Management representatives as to media releases of cancelled interruptions, where appropriate

This information will be available to the Faults Team Leader no later than 15 minutes prior to the planned interruption time.

11.2.3 AUTO RECLOSE SUPPRESSION & PROTECTION SETTING CHANGES

The Manager Network Operations (CEOT) shall ensure auto reclose is suppressed and protection settings changed in accordance with the ‘Protection Device Suppression/Modification Schedule’ on designated SWER ACR’s, Circuit Breakers and Automatic Circuit Reclosers on 22kV feeders in hazardous bushfire risk areas (HBRA’s) on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days. This includes HBRA feeders without Neutral Earthing Resistors (NERs) where the phase to ground fault current could exceed 3.5kA at the zone substation bus.

The schedule includes application of protection sequence settings in accordance with the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce recommendation 2 and the Government response\(^{13}\), to the extent that is practicable and possible (refer figure 8-2).

Determination of the ‘worst areas’ (Extreme HBRA) and ‘remaining HBRA’ is discussed in section 8.3.10 ‘Total Fire Ban Day ACR Protection Settings’.

The CEOT will maintain the ‘Protection Device Suppression/Modification Schedule’ for application of settings on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days. This schedule is provided to Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) in the form required by ESV. Management and control of the protection sequence settings are undertaken in accordance with the ‘Total Fire Ban Administration Manual’ (D127) and ‘Protection Setting Operation Guidelines on Total Fire Ban and Code Red Days’ (BFM 21-10).

Note that the following will apply to feeders within HBRA’s during the periods specified below:

**Declared Fire Season**

- In the Extreme HBRA, SWER ACRs, 22kV Circuit Breakers and 22kV ACRs will have their automatic reclose function suppressed or protection sequence settings modified on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days in accordance with Protection Device Suppression/Modification Schedule.
- In the ‘remaining’ HBRA protection settings will be applied on Total Fire Ban and Code Red days in accordance with the Protection Device Suppression/Modification Schedule.

Suppression and changes to protection sequence settings on designated devices on Total Fire Ban day or Code Red days shall occur by 10.00am or when the Fire Danger Index (FDI) exceeds 30, whichever occurs earlier.

If weather conditions abate, the Manager Network Operations (CEOT) may restore auto reclose suppression to normal. This shall not be carried out until the Fire Danger Index (FDI) falls to

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\(^{13}\) Victorian Government Response to The Victorian Bushfires royal Commission Recommendations 27 and 32, December 2011
and will remain below 30 in the location of the feeder. The FDI may be obtained by contacting the local CFA or through the Bureau of Meteorology.

The zone substations that have no Neutral Earth Resistors (NERs) require the feeder CBs to be auto reclose suppressed on days of Total Fire Ban and Code Red, unless the fast protection & control settings have been applied in accordance with the Protection Device Suppression/Modification Schedule.

### 11.2.4 REFCL PROTECTION SETTINGS

Application of the ‘required capacity’ protection setting is applied to REFCLs supplying supply networks within areas where a Total Fire Ban or Code Red Day is declared. Application of the setting applies from midnight to midnight.

Should the REFCL detect a phase to earth fault on a TFB or Code Red day it will compensate for up to 20 seconds before interrupting supply to the effected distribution feeder. Restoration of supply is undertaken in accordance with procedures discussed in Section 11.2.1 ‘Customer Energy & Operations Team (CEOT) Responsibility’.

Outside periods of heightened bushfire risk REFCLs may be operated at reduced levels of sensitivity as discussed in Section 8.3.9.3 ‘Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter Implementation’.

The REFCL system is a single contingency system and therefore is exposed to the risk of unavailability in the event of a defect. This risk is mitigated through the annual testing program discussed in Section 11.3.2 ‘REFCL Testing and Reporting’.

### 11.2.5 POEL DISCONNECTIONS

POELs with urgent defects shall be disconnected for the full period of the Total Fire Ban. However, if the Total Fire Ban commences at midnight and weather conditions during the night are not severe, then it shall be permissible to disconnect the line first thing in the morning, generally prior to 0800 hours or before weather conditions become severe.

Reconnection shall not be undertaken until after the termination of the Total Fire Ban.

### 11.2.6 NETWORK ACTIVITIES

On Total Fire Ban days the following operation and maintenance plans are applicable.

If restricted activities such as Welding, Gas Cutting, Grinding, using a Blow Lamp or Gas Torch are to be undertaken on days of Total Fire Ban, a current copy of the appropriate permit must be held on site. All conditions on the permits must be adhered to. AusNet Services personnel must ensure that contractors under their control adhere strictly to the conditions of the permits. Field crews shall ascertain Total Fire Ban status prior to commencement of any work in fire hazard areas.

Work on easements on Total Fire Ban days in fire hazard areas must be suspended, unless otherwise specifically approved by the responsible AusNet Services officer. Before work can commence a risk assessment and approval is to be carried out by the responsible officers.

If a Total Fire Ban day occurs prior to the declaration date for a region, priority outstanding maintenance items, including vegetation management items, shall be managed so that they are fire safe. Where a risk has been identified, courses of action may include fuel reduction within

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14 Refer section 8.3.9.3 ‘REFCL Implementation for explanation of ‘compensation’
15 Compensation duration may vary subject to on-going development of the technology through ESV/VESSI REFCL Technical Working Group.
close proximity of assets with outstanding urgent maintenance items or de-energisation of the assets.

**11.3 FIRE DANGER PERIOD**

**11.3.1 GENERAL**

Fire danger periods within respective municipalities are declared annually by the Country Fire Authority. Declarations depend on the amount of rain, grassland curing rate and other local conditions within respective municipalities.

The Fire Danger Period may be declared as early as October in some municipalities, and typically remains in place until the fire danger lessens, which could be as late as May.

Operation and maintenance plans during the declared fire period requires all inspections, maintenance and asset replacement activities be undertaken within the nominated periods contained in the asset data management system (SAP) in high bushfire risk areas (HBRAs). The monitoring of this activity is done through the Bushfire Mitigation Index which has a target of zero for HBRAs during fire danger periods.

**11.3.2 REFCL TESTING & REPORTING**

Testing of REFCLs supplying polyphase networks within the respective municipalities are undertaken prior to declaration of the fire danger period to ensure the REFCL is capable of operating at the *required capacity*\(^{16}\). The dates by which respective REFCLs must meet the *required capacity* compliance obligations are illustrated in figure 8-3 ‘REFCL Location and Timing of Implementation’.

Scheduling of testing is undertaken to allow for re-engineering or calibration of the network to achieve the *required capacity* prior to the fire danger period each year. Reporting of test results are subsequently provided to Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) prior to the fire danger period.

During REFCL implementation phases, AusNet Services will provide test results and actions to ESV through the Victorian Electricity Supply Industry (VESI) REFCL technical working group of which ESV is a member. The technical working group has been established to facilitate shared learnings for the VESI during on-going development and deployment of REFCLs.

Project implementation is reported monthly to ESV through standardised reporting templates developed by ESV. This reporting provides transparency as to the number of REFCLs in operation and at what ‘capacity’ they are performing during the implementation phase.

**12 FIRE PREVENTION - INVESTIGATIONS, ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY**

To ensure continuous improvement in network safety, the Network Safety Management Committee (NSMC) monitors a range of network safety performance indicators to identify opportunities to initiate investigations, analysis and implementation of strategies and programs to improve network safety performance. Key fire risk indicators monitored by the NSMC include the Fire Risk Indicator and F-factor which are leading and lagging network performance monitoring tools respectively. These indicators are discussed in further detail below.

**12.1 INVESTIGATIONS**

Network incidents are investigated and reported to Energy Safe Victoria in accordance with the *Distribution Business Electrical Safety Performance Reporting Guide*. The incident investigation and reporting procedure and fault management system (PowerOn) requires the

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\(^{16}\) *Required capacity* as defined by the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations
establishment of a root cause and an asset failure consequence. Analysis of network incident data is provided to the NSMC in the formats presented below to monitor and, where required, initiate investigation and development of recommendations to mitigate bushfire risk.

12.2 ANALYSIS

Analysis of the following key performance indicators provides guidance for the on-going development and maintenance of the preventative strategies implemented under the General Maintenance and Enhanced Network Safety programs discussed in Section 8.

12.2.1 FIRE RISK INDICATOR

The fire risk indicator utilises the sum of all network incidents that have the risk of fire ignition, multiplied by a risk weighting factor for the respective incident type. The risk weighting has been determined from historical fire incidents and their propensity to result in a fire ignition. This approach ensures that bushfire mitigation strategies are focussed on those network incidents with a higher risk of resulting in ground fire ignition.

![Fire Risk Indicator](image)

**Figure 12-1 Example of Fire Risk Indicator & Annual Target**

12.2.2 F-FACTOR

The F-factor is a regulatory incentive mechanism, administered by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), which has the objective of ensuring distribution businesses have a performance incentive targeted toward the mitigation of network related fire incidents. The F-factor reporting framework monitors actual fire incidents, consequences and their causes as illustrated below.

![F Factor](image)
12.3 METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied to ensure mitigation of bushfire risk includes a full life cycle approach for the design, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and de-commissioning of network assets. The NSMC monitors network bushfire performance and, where required, initiates investigation and analysis for the development of strategies to cost effectively mitigate bushfire risks. This continuous improvement process is supported by the broader asset and risk management frameworks provided by the Electricity Safety Management Scheme.

13 MONITORING & AUDIT

13.1 MONITORING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Monitoring is undertaken through the Network Safety Management Committee (NSMC). The principle objective and role of the NSMC, is to understand and manage the safety and bushfire risks, in planning, designing, constructing, operating, maintaining and decommissioning its supply networks to minimise in so far as is practicable:\footnote{’Practicable’ means practicable having regard to: - a) the severity of the hazard or risk in question; b) the state of knowledge about the hazard or risk and any ways of removing or mitigating the hazard or risk; c) the availability and suitability of ways to remove or mitigate the hazard or risk; and d) the cost of removing or mitigating the hazard or risk.}

\begin{itemize}
  \item a) the hazards and risks to the safety of any person arising from the supply network;
  \item b) the hazards and risks of damage to the property of any person arising from the supply network; and
  \item c) if that network is an at-risk supply network, the bushfire danger arising from that network.
\end{itemize}

Accordingly, the Charter for the NSMC is to guide development, implementation and monitoring of network asset management strategies and programs with the objective of minimising risks and hazards to persons and property as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The committee, whose membership consists of senior personnel from various business streams, provides the operational leadership and coordination of resources engaged in the development and implementation of bushfire mitigation, vegetation management and asset safety programs designed to achieve this objective.

The NSMC utilise a range of performance indicators to monitor implementation of the Plan which are provided in a monthly Network Safety Report. Among key indicators are;

\begin{itemize}
  \item **Bushfire Mitigation Index** – monitors implementation of inspection, maintenance and replacement activities contained within the General Maintenance program. Maintaining a ‘zero index’ is a key performance objective during the declared fire season,
  \item **Enhanced Safety Program reports** – monitors implementation of individual Enhanced Network Safety programs. Exceptions to network performance outcomes or emerging network risks are fed back through the Asset Management Committee for review of the asset management strategies required to address network related bushfire risks.
\end{itemize}

A hierarchy of management control has been established to monitor performance and control through the structure indicated below.
13.1.1 SENIOR MANAGEMENT REVIEW

An annual review of the Bushfire Mitigation program by the senior and executive management group is undertaken. An invitation to attend the review is also extended to members of the Board and on occasion the CFA. The objective of the review is to allow operational personnel to communicate and demonstrate to key stakeholders the diversity and operational detail of a key risk mitigation program of the business. The review also provides an opportunity to challenge current aspects of the program that may result in the initiation of further mitigation measures.

13.2 AUDITING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

AusNet Services assets and processes are subject to regular audits to verify compliance with specified technical, operational and safety standards and legislative requirements. Audits are undertaken in accordance with AusNet Services’ standard audit procedures to ensure the requisite compliance is achieved in all aspects of the design, construction, installation, operation and maintenance of the AusNet Services network. Health Safety Environment & Quality audits include:

- Technical compliance
  - Work party occupational health & safety
  - Work sites, depots and offices safety & environment
  - Work quality
  - Asset standards
- Management systems
  - Data and information management
  - Procedure reviews

Teams undertaking these audits are trained and competent to ensure a consistent and effective approach to auditing is maintained. The audits are undertaken using the asset life cycle methodology of design, construction and maintenance and are undertaken in the following categories relating to bushfire mitigation activities:

- Inspection & assessment
  - Asset inspection
  - Vegetation clearances
- Work execution
  - Work party occupational health & safety
  - Quality of work
    - Compliance with asset standards
    - Compliance with vegetation clearances and practices

Results of the Health, Safety, Environment and Quality (HSE&Q) audits are reported monthly to senior and line management and include audit summaries for the period identifying audits
performed against audits scheduled, their percentage score and associated grading; trend analysis and improvement initiatives; and, recommendations on future directions.

![Cumulative Number of Audits](image)

**Figure 13-2 Example of Audit Reporting**

Audit recommendations and observations are recorded in a quality management system (Issues Management System) which provides an automated process for notification and follow-up of persons responsible for implementation.

### 13.2.1 ENERGY SAFE VICTORIA AUDITS

Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) undertake an annual desk top and field audit of AusNet Services’ Bushfire Mitigation Plan and scheduled audit of the Electricity Safety Management System. Agreed recommendations and observations have an implementation plan developed and actions assigned to responsible persons. The implementation plan is recorded in a quality management system (IMS) for implementation.

### 13.2.2 CERTIFICATION AUDITS

Certification for the following management systems is maintained through a program of regular mandatory compliance audits by independent and accredited service providers:

- ISO 55001 – Asset Management – Management Systems
- AS 4801 – Occupational Health & Safety System
- ISO 9001 – Quality Management System
- ISO 14001 – Environmental Management System

### 13.3 PLAN EFFECTIVENESS

The Network Safety Management Committee (NSMC) identifies deficiencies in the Plan’s implementation through the following key performance indicators:

- **Bushfire Mitigation Index** – The BMI monitors progress in the inspection of assets and assessment of vegetation against program target dates. The BMI then monitors the completion of asset maintenance and replacement activities identified through the inspection and assessment programs.

- **Enhanced Network Safety Programs** - The delivery of individual asset management strategies against program targets is monitored and reported quarterly to Energy Safe Victoria.
The Network Safety Management Committee identifies deficiencies in the Plan’s effectiveness through the following key performance indicators;

**Fire Risk Indicator** – This provides a leading indicator through monitoring of all network incidents with the potential to result in fire. This is used to identify opportunities for corrective strategies to mitigate bushfire risk.

**F-factor** – A regulatory performance based incentive mechanism designed to direct network investment into the reduction of fire incidents.

**Fire Incidents** – Individual fire incidents are reviewed and reported in the monthly Network Safety Report to the NSMC.

### 13.4 INSPECTIONS EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness of inspection programs is critical with ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the network. Investigations and analysis, discussed in Section 12, of network asset failures provides an iterative process for review of inspection programs to ensure their effectiveness.

Two key areas of focus that ensure inspection programs remain effective are:

- Inspection criteria & methods, and
- Quality of inspections undertaken.

#### 13.4.1 ASSET CONDITION ASSESSMENT CRITERIA & METHODS

Continuous monitoring and analysis of asset failures provides opportunities to identify modifications to current asset assessment, maintenance or replacement criteria that will further mitigate the risk of failure. This process, which includes application of analysis methodologies such as Failure Modes Effects and Cause Analysis (FMECA), supports AusNet Services’ Asset Management Strategy (AMS 20-01) and its suite of individual asset management strategies.

Asset performance indicators such as the Fire Risk Indicator and F-factor are tools that are used to identify opportunities to develop practicable and effective inspection criteria or methods that can be cost effectively deployed to prevent unplanned failures. This continuous improvement and development process for asset inspection has resulted in the following methods and techniques, which are consistent with the *ENA Inspection Guideline*[^18], being utilised in asset inspection;

- Thermography surveys,
- Radio frequency surveys,
- Corona surveys,
- Intrusive testing criteria and treatment of timber poles,
- Calibration of visual asset inspection criteria,
- High resolution digital photography supported by
  - Helicopter mounted cameras,
  - Telescopic stick mounted camera,
  - Unmanned aerial vehicle mounted cameras,
  - Ground based inspector use of cameras.
- Sampling and forensic analysis of asset components,
- Asset management systems to support recording and monitoring of asset performance,
- Energy Safe Victoria approved inspection training courses

[^18]: Energy Networks Association, Industry Guideline for the Inspection, Assessment and Maintenance of Overhead Powerlines, ENA Doc 017-2008
13.4.2 QUALITY OF INSPECTIONS

Within the corporate Health Safety Environment and Quality (HSE&Q) Management System auditing framework discussed in Section 13.2, is the audit of ground and aerial based asset inspection and vegetation clearance assessments. Audits of individual inspectors and assessors are undertaken against established sampling rates and quality assessment criteria. The assessment template is designed to monitor an inspector or assessor’s level of compliance and competence with inspection of assets in accordance with the criteria and standards contained in the Asset Inspection Manual. The templates assign appropriate levels of risk weighting to individual inspection criteria. An inspector or assessor’s inspection quality is monitored and discussed with the individual to ensure the maintenance of required standards.

13.5 PLAN IMPROVEMENTS

The Network Safety Management Committee monitors the following indicators to identify, initiate and implement opportunities for improvement of the Plan’s overall effectiveness:

- Asset performance indicators
  - Fire Risk Indicator,
  - F-factor
- Program implementation indicators
  - Bushfire Mitigation Index,
  - Enhanced Network Safety Program implementation
- Audits
  - Inspection & assessment audits,
  - Work quality audits,
  - Energy Safe Victoria compliance audits, and
  - Certification surveillance & compliance audits

13.6 TRAINING

AusNet Services has established ‘Skilling for the Future’ strategies that identify long term resource levels and skill mix requirements. Post descriptions for the respective roles within AusNet Services’ work environment contain qualification, skills and competency requirements. AusNet Services’ personnel are managed through a centralised human resource database. Contractual arrangements for external resource provision specify minimum qualifications, skills and competency requirements.

The minimum level of skill and competence for each category of worker is established by the Victorian Electricity Supply Industry (VESI) and are based on the standards in the national Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) – Transmission, Distribution and Rail Sector Training Package (UET09) in accordance with National Competency Guidelines. This includes initial and cyclic refresher training requirements. Competencies and training of service providers are managed by the respective service providers and are also required to comply with the Electricity Supply Industry requirements.

National training competencies are delivered by a Registered Training Organisation (RTO) whose scope of registration includes the required competencies. All RTOs are required to meet the standards as outlined in the 2007 training framework. All Passport refresher modules which are not nationally accredited may be delivered by a person who holds as a minimum a Certificate IV in Workplace Training and Assessment (or equivalent) and is able to demonstrate vocational competence and experience in the subject matter of the Passport module they are delivering.

19 Australian Quality Training Framework 2007 - Essential Standards for Registration
To ensure only competent and qualified personnel are permitted to work on the electrical network, competencies and training are recorded in AusNet Services’ learning content management systems and are shown in the individual’s VESI Network Passport.

AusNet Services’ training and competency requirements are reflected, as required, in respective contracts with third party service providers.

Section 6.11 ‘Training and Competency’ of the Electricity Safety Management System details the enterprise wide framework.

13.6.1 ASSET INSPECTION TRAINING COURSE

The training courses for AusNet Services’ asset inspectors and assessors are approved by Energy Safe Victoria as required by the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations. Refer Appendix 4.

13.7 INSPECTOR COMPETENCY

13.7.1 AUDIT

Competence of inspectors is essential to ensuring the on-going effectiveness of inspection programs and their ability to maintain the safe and reliable operation of the network. Accordingly, work quality audits for individual inspectors engaged in asset and vegetation inspection are undertaken against established sampling rates and quality assessment criteria. The respective assessment templates are designed to monitor an inspector’s level of compliance and competence with inspection of assets or vegetation in accordance with criteria and standards contained in the Asset Inspection Manual and Vegetation Management Plan respectively. The templates assign appropriate levels of risk weighting to individual inspection criteria. An inspector’s quality of work is monitored and discussed with the individual to ensure the maintenance of required standards.

13.7.2 MONITORING

The results of audits are monitored to identify deficiencies and trends that require implementation of corrective actions. In accordance with AusNet Services’ quality management system and procedures, corrective actions are recorded in a quality management system (Issues Management System) and implementation of actions monitored through the Network Safety Management Committee.

14 PUBLIC AWARENESS

14.1.1 GENERAL

It is essential that the community be aware of the potential fire hazards that can arise from the poor maintenance of Private Electric Lines and the selection of inappropriate vegetation species for planting near powerlines. To address this, a comprehensive communication program focusing on the following issues is maintained:

- The potential of the Distribution Network to be a cause of fire ignition
- Trees and powerlines do not mix; and
- Reminders to Private Electric Line owners of their responsibilities.
Publications made available to customers may include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Material</th>
<th>Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Your Guide to Planting Near Powerlines</em></td>
<td>Freshwater Place Southbank (8.30 am to 5.00 pm Monday to Friday).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                                                             | Call Centre 1300 360 795  
| *Brochure Private Electric Lines Your Responsibilities*     | Freshwater Place Southbank (8.30 am to 5.00 pm Monday to Friday). |
|                                                             | Call Centre 1300 360 795  
| *BFM Advertising Material*                                  | Regional TV, Radio, Newspaper & Billboards      |

*Figure 14-1 Customer Information Publications*

Advertising campaigns are undertaken utilising a combination of the following media:

- Visually descriptive television awareness campaigns
- Newspaper advertisements in various newspapers
- Articles and advertisements in various journals and magazines
- Radio commercials communicating fire awareness messages; and
- Other mediums as the opportunity arise.

The Public Relations & Communications Manager ensures effectiveness of communication programs through:

- Review of the effectiveness of public awareness programs
- Making recommendations to the Network Safety Management Committee on the public awareness program; and
- Co-ordinate the public awareness program.

### 14.2 PRIVATE ELECTRIC LINE BROCHURE

To remind customers of their responsibilities and the importance of their bushfire mitigation activities, reminders are distributed annually to the occupiers of land with overhead Private Overhead Electric Lines (POEL). The reminder provides information concerning the typical hazards associated with POELs.

Wherever a "Defect Notice" is issued to a customer with a POEL, the brochure outlining responsibilities is issued to the occupier of the land.
14.3 AUSNET SERVICES OBLIGATIONS

The brochure ‘Private Overhead Electric Lines, Your Responsibilities’ contains the following information concerning AusNet Services’ obligations for inspection.

The Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013 require AusNet Services to inspect private overhead electric lines. AusNet Services regularly inspects its powerlines in your area. AusNet Services will also inspect the part of your overhead electric lines from the point of supply to the meter and, if AusNet Services finds any defects, will issue you with a rectification notice that you need to comply with. AusNet Services’ current cycle for inspections of private overhead electric lines is at least once every 37 months in hazardous bushfire risk areas; and at least once every 61 months in low bushfire risk areas.

AusNet Services also ensures customer notification of POEL inspection is not more than 45 days before an inspection and not less than 21 days before the inspection. Customer notification is provided in the form provided in the Schedule to the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations.

14.3.1 INSPECTION STANDARD FOR POEL

The inspection of a POEL is undertaken in accordance with the standards prescribed under regulation 10 of the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013.
15 APPENDICES

15.1 APPENDIX 1 - PRESCRIBED PARTICULARS OF BUSHFIRE MITIGATION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>AusNet Services Reference Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(a)</td>
<td>the name, address and telephone number of the major electricity company</td>
<td>This Document - Section 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(b)</td>
<td>the position, address and telephone number of the person who was responsible for the preparation of the plan</td>
<td>This Document - Section 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(c)</td>
<td>the position, address and telephone number of the persons who are responsible for carrying out the plan</td>
<td>This Document - Section 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(d)</td>
<td>the telephone number of the major electricity company's control room so that persons in the room can be contacted in an emergency that requires action by the major electricity company to mitigate the danger of bushfire</td>
<td>This Document - Section 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(e)</td>
<td>the bushfire mitigation policy of the major electricity company to minimise the risk of fire ignition from its supply network</td>
<td>This Document - Section 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(f)</td>
<td>the objectives of the plan to achieve the mitigation of fire danger arising from the major electricity company's supply network</td>
<td>This Document - Section 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(g)</td>
<td>a description, map or plan of the land to which the bushfire mitigation plan applies</td>
<td>This Document - Section 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(h)</td>
<td>the preventative strategies and programs to be adopted by the major electricity company to minimise the risk of the major electricity company's supply networks starting fires</td>
<td>This Document - Section 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(ha)</td>
<td>details of the preventative strategies and programs referred to in paragraph (h) (including details in relation to timing and location) by which the major electricity company will ensure that— (i) in its supply network, each polyphase electric line originating from a selected zone substation has the required capacity; and (ii) on and from 1 May 2023, in its supply network, each polyphase electric line originating from every zone substation specified in Schedule 2 has the required capacity;</td>
<td>This Document – Section 8 &amp; 11 Sec 8.3.9.3 REFCL Implementation Sec 11.3.2 REFCL Testing &amp; Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(hb)</td>
<td>details of testing that will be undertaken before the specified bushfire risk period each year by which the major electricity company will ensure that its supply network can operate to meet the required capacity in relation to each polyphase electric line in accordance with paragraph (ha);</td>
<td>This Document – Section 11 Sec 11.3.2 REFCL Testing &amp; Reporting Sec 11.2.4 REFCL Protection Settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(hc)</td>
<td>details of the preventative strategies and programs referred to in paragraph (h) (including details in relation to timing and location) by which the major electricity company will ensure that, on and from 1 May 2016, within an electric line construction area, each electric line with a nominal voltage of between 1 kV and 22 kV that is constructed, or is wholly or substantially replaced, in its supply network is a covered or underground electric line;</td>
<td>This Document – Section 8 Sec 8.3.6 Conductor Replacement Sec 8.3.7 Electric Line Construction (Codified) Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>AusNet Services Reference Document</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(hd)</td>
<td>details of the processes and procedures by which the major electricity company will ensure that, before 1 May 2023, the major electricity company has installed an Automatic Circuit Recloser in relation to each SWER line in its supply network;</td>
<td>This Document – Section 8 Sec 8.3.9.1 Automatic Circuit Reclosers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(i)</td>
<td>a plan for inspection that ensures that: (i) the parts of the major electricity company's supply network in hazardous bushfire risk areas are inspected at intervals not exceeding 37 months from the date of the previous inspection; and (ii) the parts of the major electricity company's supply network in other areas are inspected at specified intervals not exceeding 61 months from the date of the previous inspection;</td>
<td>This Document - Section 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(j)</td>
<td>details of the processes and procedures for ensuring that each person who is assigned to carry out inspections referred to in paragraph (i) and of private electric lines has satisfactorily completed a training course approved by Energy Safe Victoria and is competent to carry out such inspections;</td>
<td>This Document - Section 10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(k)</td>
<td>details of the processes and procedures for ensuring that persons (other than persons referred to in paragraph (j)) who carry out or will carry out functions under the plan are competent to do so</td>
<td>This Document - Section 10.2 This Document - Section 13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(l)</td>
<td>the operation and maintenance plans for the major electricity company's supply network (i) in the event of a fire; and (ii) during a total fire ban day; and (iii) during a fire danger period</td>
<td>This Document - Section 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(m)</td>
<td>the investigations, analysis and methodology to be adopted by the major electricity company for the mitigation of the risk of fire ignition from its supply network</td>
<td>This Document - Section 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(n)</td>
<td>details of the processes and procedures by which the major electricity company will (i) monitor the implementation of the bushfire mitigation plan; and (ii) audit the implementation of the plan; and (iii) identify any deficiencies in the plan or the plan's implementation; and (iv) change the plan and the plan's implementation to rectify any deficiencies identified under subparagraph (iii); and (v) monitor the effectiveness of inspections carried out under the plan; and (vi) audit the effectiveness of inspections carried out under the plan (vii) before the specified bushfire risk period each year, report to Energy Safe Victoria the results of testing undertaken in that year in accordance with regulation 7(1)(hb);</td>
<td>This Document - Section 13.1 &amp; 13.2 This Document - Section 13.3 This Document - Section 13.4 This Document - Section 13.5 This Document - Section 13.6 This Document - Section 13.7 This Document – Section 11.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(o)</td>
<td>the policy of the major electricity company in relation to the assistance to be provided to fire control authorities in the investigation of fires near the major electricity company's supply network</td>
<td>This Document - Section 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Requirements <em>Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013</em></td>
<td>AusNet Services Reference Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(p)</td>
<td>details of processes and procedures for enhancing public awareness of</td>
<td>This Document - Section 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) the responsibilities of owners of private electric lines that are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>above the surface of the land in relation to maintenance and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mitigation of bushfire danger; (ii) the obligation of the major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity company to inspect private electric lines that are above</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the surface of the land within its distribution area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (1)(q)</td>
<td>a description of the measures to be used to assess the performance</td>
<td>This Document – Section 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the major electricity company under the plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (3)</td>
<td>For the purposes of subregulation (1)(ha)(i)— (a) the major</td>
<td>This Document – Section 8 &amp; 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity company must select a sufficient number of zone</td>
<td>Sec 8.3.9.3 REFCL Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substations so that— (i) at 1 May 2019, the points set out in</td>
<td>Sec 11.3.2 REFCL Testing &amp; Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>column 6 of the Table in Schedule 2 in relation to each zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substation selected, when totalled, are not less than 30; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) at 1 May 2021, the points set out in column 6 of the Table in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schedule 2 in relation to each zone substation selected, when totalled, are not less than 55; or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) if there are an insufficient number of zone substations (specified in Schedule 2) in a major electricity company's supply network for the major electricity company to comply with paragraph (a)(i) or (ii), the major electricity company must ensure that each polyphase electric line originating from every zone substation that is specified in Schedule 2 and is in its supply network has the required capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 (a) &amp; (b)</td>
<td>(a) for private electric lines located in hazardous bushfire risk areas, no later than 37 months after the date of the previous inspection carried out by the major electricity company; (b) for private electric lines located in other areas, no later than 61 months after the date of the previous inspection carried out by the major electricity company.</td>
<td>This Document - Section 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th><em>Electricity Safety Act 1998</em></th>
<th>AusNet Services Reference Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113A (3)</td>
<td>A major electricity company must cause a copy of its accepted bushfire mitigation plan to be made available for inspection— (a) on the company's Internet site; and (b) at the company's principal office in the State during ordinary business hours.</td>
<td>This Document - Section 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.2 APPENDIX 2 – SAMPLE DISPLAY OF HBRA & LBRA AREAS

Sample Spatial Analysis Management System (SAMS) display of the HBRA & LBRA fire zones and Electricity Assets for the AusNet Services Distribution area.

Figure 15-1 SAMS display, LBRA shown in 'light blue'

The SAMS information related to electrical assets will be made available to the public on request at our Freshwater Place office at 2 Southbank Boulevard, Southbank (8.30 am to 5.00 pm Monday to Friday) preferably with 24 hour prior notice.
## 15.3 APPENDIX 3 – VBRC COMPLIANCE MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2009 VBRC Recommendations</th>
<th>Reference within this Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>VBRC Recommendation 27</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State amend the Regulations under Victoria’s Electricity Safety Act 1998 and otherwise take such steps as may be required to give effect to the following: The progressive replacement of all SWER power lines in Victoria with aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk. The replacement program should be completed in the areas of highest bushfire risk within 10 years and should continue in areas of lower bushfire risk as the lines reach the end of their engineering lives. The progressive replacement of all 22kV distribution feeders with aerial bundled cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk as the feeders reach the end of their engineering lives. Priority should be given to distribution feeders in the areas of highest bushfire risk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PBST Recommendation 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity distributors implement the 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission’s recommendation 27 by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| a) installing new generation protection devices to instantaneously detect and turn off power at a fault on high fire risk days:  
  • on SWER powerlines in the next five years (new generation SWER ACRs)  
  • on 22kV powerlines in the next 10 years (rapid earth fault current limiters)  
| b) target replacement of SWER11 and 22kV powerlines with underground or insulated overhead cable, or conversion of SWER to multi-wire powerlines, in the next 10 years to the level of between $500 million and $3 billion, consistent with the package of measures selected by the Victorian Government. These should be implemented in the highest fire loss consequence areas first. Any new powerlines that are built in the areas targeted for powerline replacement should also be built with underground or insulated overhead cable. |                           |
| **VBRC Recommendation 28**                                                                |                           |
| The State (through ESV) require distribution businesses to change their asset inspection standards and procedures to require that all SWER and all 22kV feeders in areas of high bushfire risk are inspected at least every three years. | Reg 7(i) – refer sections 10.1 & table 9.1 |
| **Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013, regulation 7(j)**            |                           |
| **VBRC Recommendation 29**                                                                |                           |
| The State (through ESV) require distribution businesses to review and modify their current practices, standards and procedures for the training and auditing of asset inspectors to ensure that registered training organisations provide adequate theoretical and practical training for asset inspectors. | Reg 7(j) – refer sections 10.2 & 13.6.1 |
| **Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013, regulation 7(j)**            |                           |
| **VBRC Recommendation 30**                                                                |                           |
| The State amend the regulatory framework for the electricity safety to require that distribution businesses adopt, as part of their management plans, measures to reduce the risks posed by hazard trees - that is, trees that are outside the clearance zone but that could come in contact with an electric power line having regard to the foreseeable local conditions. | VBRC 30 refer- section 8.3.2 |
| **VBRC Recommendation 32**                                                                |                           |
| The State (through ESV) require distribution businesses to do the following:  
Disable the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all SWER lines for the six weeks of greatest risk in every fire season  
Adjust the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all 22kV feeders on all total fire ban days to permit only one reclose attempt before lockout. |                           |
| **PBST Recommendation 2**                                                                 |                           |
| Electricity distributors implement the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission’s recommendation 32 by adjusting the protection systems for 22kV and SWER powerlines based on the severity of the day and the fire loss consequence of the area so that at a fault there are: |                           |
### 2009 VBRC Recommendations

#### Powerline Bushfire Taskforce Recommendation 2

Electricity distribution businesses should adjust the protection systems for 22kV and SWER powerlines based on the severity of the day and the fire loss consequence of the area so that at a fault there are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total Fire Ban day</th>
<th>Code Red day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural powerlines in the worst areas</td>
<td>Two fast protection operations</td>
<td>One fast protection operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(approximately 20 per cent of rural powerlines)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural powerlines in remaining areas</td>
<td>One fast and one slow protection operation</td>
<td>One fast and one slow protection operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(approximately 80 per cent of rural powerlines)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the 2011/12 fire season, to the extent practicable and possible, the electricity distributors change the protection systems at 10:00am or when the fire danger index exceeds 30, whichever occurs earlier, until the fire danger index falls below 30.

#### VBRC Recommendation 33

The State (through ESV) require distribution businesses to do the following:
- Fit spreaders to any lines with a history of clashing or the potential to do so.
- Fit or retro-fit all spans that are more than 300 metres long with vibration dampers as soon as is reasonably practicable.

**ESV Directives**
- ESV approved AusNet Services Plan – Conductor Spacers AMS 20-52-2
- ESV approved AusNet Services Plan – Vibration Dampers & Armour Rods AMS 20-52-1

#### VBRC Recommendations 27 & 32

The PBST provided a range of recommendations to ‘ensure the greatest benefits of the Taskforce’s recommendations 1 & 2.’ The Victorian government accepted PBST recommendation 3(h) that relates to distribution businesses.

**PBST Recommendation 3 (h)**

By 30 June 2012, the electricity distributors submit a plan to ESV to reduce the fire risk associated with low voltage lines and service lines where it is cost effective to do so.
15.4 APPENDIX 4 – APPROVED INSPECTION TRAINING COURSE

ESV ref: G81045

19 October 2011

David Ellis
Campus Manager
Chadstone Campus
Central Gippsland Institute of TAFE
41 Drummond Street
CHADSTONE VIC 3148

Dear Mr Ellis,

ASSET INSPECTION TRAINING COURSE

As you are aware, the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2010 require persons carrying out asset inspections to have satisfactorily completed a training course approved by Energy Safe Victoria (ESV). In consultation with the industry, GippsTAFE has been developing a Certificate II Asset Inspection course to meet this need.

GippsTAFE has prepared the detailed course content for two of the key elements and these have been reviewed by ESV. Although some minor modifications have been requested, the course content for these two elements has been assessed as satisfactory. As discussed with Noel Sutcliffe at a recent meeting, ESV requests that you forward the detailed course content for the remaining elements as they are prepared.

ESV has also reviewed the process for the recognition of prior learning (RPL) for the course and has assessed this as highly satisfactory. ESV understands that around 90 RPL applications have been assessed and found to be satisfactory, and that a further 20 are yet to be assessed. ESV would like to be informed of the outcome of the assessment of the remaining applications.

Based on the material provided, I am pleased to advise you that ESV has approved the Certificate II Asset Inspection Course.

Should you have any queries in relation to this matter, please contact Ian Marks on 9203 9730.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Paul Fearon
DIRECTOR OF ENERGY SAFETY
12 November 2012

Mr David Matassoni
Manager Network Safety
SP AusNet
Locked Bag 14501
MELBOURNE VIC 8001

Dear Mr Matassoni

APPROVAL OF TRAINING COURSE FOR LINESMEN TO INSPECT OVERHEAD ASSETS

As you are aware, section 5A(k) of the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2003 (the regulations) requires persons carrying out asset inspections to have satisfactorily completed a training course approved by Energy Safe Victoria (ESV).

GippsTAFE provides asset inspection training for Distribution workers as part of the Distribution Apprentice Linesmen course.

The relevant units of the Distribution Apprentice Linesmen course provided by GippsTAFE currently are:

- UETTDRDP01B (or UETTDRDP11A) - Inspect overhead structures and electrical apparatus (poles /structures)
- UETTDREL02B (or UETTDREL12A) - Operate plant and equipment near live electrical conductors/apparatus
- UETTDREL04B (or UETTDREL16A) - Working safely near live electrical apparatus as non electrical worker
- UEEENE001B (or UEEENE101A) - Apply OHS practices in the workplace

(Future units as per changes to the National Qualifications are noted in brackets. Future units are part of UET30612, Certificate III in ESI – Power Systems – Distribution Overhead)

ESV has reviewed the unit outline associated with the Distribution Apprentice Linesmen course, and accepts that upon satisfactory completion of the Distribution Apprentice Linesmen scheme, together with SP AusNet’s Asset Inspection Training Requirements (SOP 22-02, Issue Number 2. Date of Approval 6/8/2012), meets the requirements of the regulation for training of distribution linesmen to inspect pole top assets.
An associated issue is the assessment of Recognised Prior Learning (RPL) for existing distribution linesmen that are required to inspect pole top assets. As all current distribution linesmen are required to have completed the above units or equivalent, or will be refreshed in these units or equivalent units in the future, and have relevant field experience, it is permitted for these distribution linesmen to perform pole top inspection.

In order to finalise this matter, could you please amend SPI Electricity’s Bushfire Mitigation Plan (2012/13) to show these units and any other required training to be the minimum for distribution linesmen to perform pole top asset inspections.

Should you have any queries in relation to this matter, please call Gavin Jackson on (03) 9203 9753.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Noel Murray

MANAGER ELECTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SAFETY
15.5 APPENDIX 5 – REFCL CAPITAL WORKS TO BE COMMENCED IN THE 2016 TO 2020 REGULATORY CONTROL PERIOD

As explained in section 8.3.9.3, AusNet Services plans to implement REFCL technology at the 22 zone substations prescribed in Schedule 2 of the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013 through three tranches of work. The zone substations where REFCL installation work is expected to be commenced during the 2016 to 2020 regulatory control period are:

- Wonthaggi
- Myrtleford
- Barnawartha
- Rubicon A
- Kinglake
- Wangaratta
- Seymour
- Woori Yallock
- Kilmore South
- Ringwood North
- Eltham
- Ferntree Gully
- Kalkallo
- Moe
- Belgrave
- Lilydale
- Bairnsdale

Under the AER’s 2016-20 regulatory determination, AusNet Services’ costs of REFCL installation work commenced during the 2016 to 2020 regulatory period will be recovered through the contingent project provisions of the National Electricity Rules. The tranches that are adopted for the purposes of AusNet Services’ contingent project applications may differ from those presented in section 8.3.9.3, due to changes in operational requirements or network bushfire risk profiles.

The work that AusNet Services must complete to comply with the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013 is highly technical and logistically complex. It requires a detailed planning and scoping exercise as a first step. In broad terms, installing REFCL technology requires five inter-related work streams to be undertaken in relation to each zone substation implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work stream</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone substation work</td>
<td>Installing REFCLs at a zone substation and undertaking the necessary site modifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Balancing</td>
<td>Work to achieve line capacitive balancing of each automatic switchable section. This may involve, for example, installation of balancing capacitors. AusNet Service intends to balance each automatic switchable section to maintain network flexibility and contingency on high risk days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Hardening</td>
<td>Replacing line surge arrestors that are not capable of sustaining REFCL operation with those that can.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatible equipment</td>
<td>Replacing line assets that are not compatible with REFCL operation or risk compromising network safety or reliability. This work may entail the replacement of switches, ACRs, and line regulators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Work required to maintain code compliance, in particular the Victorian Electricity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with Codes

Distribution Code, to ensure compatibility and safe operation in respect of voltage rises at HV customer connections.

It is important to note that while the main REFCL equipment is located in the zone substation, extensive work is also required on the high voltage powerlines supplying the surrounding areas from the zone substation. This is because the operation of the REFCL in response to a fallen powerline has the effect of increasing the voltage on the remaining powerlines and associated network assets. Unless these assets are strengthened or ‘hardened’ to ensure that they are capable of operating safely at elevated voltage levels, the operation of the REFCL may unintentionally cause other assets to fail, thereby introducing potential fire hazards.

AusNet Services has installed its first operational REFCL at Woori Yallock zone substation (WYK). As noted in section 8.3.9.3, commissioning of REFCL technology at WYK is scheduled for the 2016/17 fire season. However, the initial design for WYK was completed prior to the finalisation of the compliance standards in the *Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013* in May 2016. The testing subsequently completed at WYK in August and September 2016 has indicated the need for further work to ensure that WYK provides the required capacity, in accordance with section 7(1)(ha)(i) of the regulations.

Accordingly, further station works, network hardening and line balancing works at WYK are required to ensure that each polyphase line from that zone substation has the required capacity. This work is required to commence in the early part of the 2016-20 regulatory period.
# 16 Schedule of Revisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15/6/2006</td>
<td>Document updated to reflect 2006-07 season requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9/6/2008</td>
<td>Document updated to reflect 2008-09 season requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>26/11/2008</td>
<td>Document updated to include statement in Sec 3.4 that in general terms during the declared fire season the network is operated as normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30/6/2009</td>
<td>Document updated to reflect 2009-10 season requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7/9/2009</td>
<td>Minor updates to reflect changes in responsibilities re asset inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>30/6/2010</td>
<td>Document updated to reflect 2010-11 season requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>23/9/2010</td>
<td>Objective in Sec. 2.8 amended to reflect requirements in new Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>27/6/2011</td>
<td>Document updated to reflect 2011-12 season requirements and to update Asset Inspection Cycles in Section 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>13/9/2011</td>
<td>Document updated to include comments from ESV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>25/10/2011</td>
<td>Document updated to include further comments from ESV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3/1/2012</td>
<td>Section 3.4.3.3 updated to include changes to the operational settings of protective devices during periods of TFB and on Code Red Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>20/1/2012</td>
<td>Revisions to sec. 3.4.3.3 to reflect changes to OCR settings to occur manually on TFB &amp; Code Red Days &amp; Sec 3.4.3.1 to reflect revised supply restoration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>16/2/2012</td>
<td>Revise section 2.1 ‘Training’ to reflect ESV acceptance of asset inspection training course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>29/6/2012</td>
<td>Major revision to BFM Plan – Remove detail not required under prescribed requirements of regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>18/10/2012</td>
<td>Revision to accommodate changes to the regulations introduced 28/6/2012 that removed the term ‘at risk’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>07/12/2012</td>
<td>Revised sec 8.3.9 Enhanced Feeder Protection &amp; Control and sec 11.2.3 A/R Suppression &amp; Prot Setting Changes for application of revised FLCM. Sec 10.2 Asset Inspector Training revised to reflect ESV approval for linesman inspection activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>16/06/2013</td>
<td>Section 11.2 ‘TFB &amp; Code Red Days’ updated to reflect CEOT procedures DOP 10-10 &amp; DOP 90-28. Sec 7 ‘Contacts’ list updated. Table 4 Safety Program updated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>18/09/2013</td>
<td>Amended section 8.2.1 &amp; 13.6.1 as requested by ESV - email dated 16/09/2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>22/07/2014</td>
<td>Amended 8.3.14.1 reflecting PRF reporting requirements. Added 15.6 PRF reporting template.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Details of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>12/12/2016</td>
<td>Include requirements to address amendments introduced 1 May 2016. Refer Appendix 15.1 which contains new regulations 7(1)(ha),(hb),(hc),(hd),(n)(vii) &amp; 7(3) with reference to amended sections in Plan. Sec 8.3.10 &amp; 11.2.3 updated to reflect application of AN140 FLCM to determine ‘worst’ and ‘remaining’ consequence areas. General review of strategies and programs from previous 2011-15 EDPR period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>11/01/2017</td>
<td>ESV request minor modification to sec 8.3.7 &amp; 11.2.3. Sec 8.3.9.3 updated with REFCL contingent project application info and inclusion of appendix 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>23/03/2017</td>
<td>Section 8.3.9.3, ‘REFCL Implementation’ and Appendix 5 high level scope of works amended for consistency with contingent project submission to AER.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16-1 Schedule of Revisions**